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Documenting the long term impact of structural policies on economic performance has generated tremendous
interest in the development literature. In contrast, contemporary effects of structural policies are difﬁcult to
establish. Structural policies seldom change sufﬁciently in the short run, and accepted instruments to control for
endogeneity in cross sections are inappropriate for time series analysis. In this paper we utilize an eleven year
panel of 26transitioncountriesto identifyshortterm effects of structuralpolicies thatarelarge and signiﬁcant.A
ten percent change in the quality of structural policies (or the Rule of Law) towards OECD standards is shown to
raise annual growth by about 2.5%. To control for endogeneity, we develop an instrument using the hierarchy of
institutions hypothesis and ﬁnd that it holds a robust explanatory power. We also document that early reformers
reap the greatest beneﬁts, but that it is never too late to begin structural policy reforms.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A growing strand of the empirical growth literature focuses on the
explanatory power of structural policies or institutions to account for
differences in living standards across countries.
1 In general, structural
policies evolve slowly, and empirical studies focus on their long term
inﬂuences on income levels (e.g., Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al.,
2001).
2 Instead of examining long term effects of structural policies
that are captured in cross sections, we investigate their contemporary
short term effects on economic growth in a panel of countries.
Two issues have prevented researchers from identifying the growth
effects of structural policies. A panel approach requires a sufﬁciently
large variation not only in structural policies, but also in the relevant
instrumentsthatarenecessarytocontrolforendogeneity.Generallythis
variation does not exist in the data. We resolve both issues by utilizing
the fall of the Iron Curtain as a natural experiment that allows us to
examine how communist-to-capitalist system changes are associated
with rapid changes in structural policies that catch up to OECD
standards. The fall of the Iron Curtain provides a unique controlled, or
natural, experiment in that the initial institutional change is clearly
exogenous, which potentially mitigates the endogeneity bias. It also
provides a unique opportunity to analyze the impact of subsequent
structural policy changes on growth in a sizeable number of countries,
with similar initial conditions, over the same period of time.
Theoverridingfeatureinourpanelischangeinthreedimensions.First,
we observe diverse patterns of output changes over time. Second,
structural policies evolved at varying speeds as countries transitioned
from centrally-planned towards market-based systems. Third, political
institutions moved progressively, and again at varying speeds, from
autocracytodemocracyafterthefallofone-partyregimes.Thedifferential
performances in transition countries have been closely linked to
differences in institutions or structural policies across countries.
3 For
most countries in most times there is no inherent reason to expect a
contemporary effect of structural policies on economic performance.
Institutions or structural policies are usually seen as persistent, but this
speciﬁc period and set of countries provides an excellent example of what
North (1990) coined “discontinuous institutional change.” The approach
hasbeenformalizedbyKrasner(1993)andNorris(1997)ina“punctuated
institutional equilibrium” that describes institutions in long periods of
stasis, interrupted by crises that bring about abrupt change.
The endogeneity of institutions or structural policies raises serious
econometric issues that have been amply documented in the previous
literature(seeAcemoglu,2005forasurvey).Fixedeffectpanelanalysis
cannot utilize the established cross-sectional instruments such as
latitude, language, settler mortality, or any other history-based
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variables.Ourtaskistoidentifynewinstrumentsthatareuncorrelated
withthedisturbances,butthatvarysufﬁcientlyovertimetoisolatethe
effects of ongoing institutional change on economic performance. Our
strategy is two-pronged. On the one hand, we use the system GMM
estimator, which Blundell and Bond (1998), Bond et al. (2001), and
Bond (2002) argue to be unbiased in the presence of endogenous
independent variables when lags go beyond 2 (we use lags 3 to 5).
Alternatively, we develop instruments using the hierarchy of institu-
tions hypothesis (Williamson, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Roland,
2004) to address endogeneity. Here the notion is that political
institutions are critical determinants of economic institutions or
structural policies, which subsequently determine economic out-
comes. Hence political institutions could theoretically function as
instruments in our analysis.
In the tradition of the long run institutions literature, we ﬁrst
report cross section results that establish the importance of the initial
quality level of structural reforms on subsequent income and growth.
4
Thenwe usepanelanalysis to examinethe impactofshort termeffects
of structural policies across economies. Even after controlling for
endogeneity, the contemporaneous effect of structural policies on
growth is shown to be large. For example, a ten percent improvement
in institutions is shown to raise the annual growth rate by about 2.7%
in the panel. This result is remarkably robust to a variety of different
speciﬁcations, including changes in the time horizon, averaging over
time periods, using transition time, the use of alternative instruments,
or institution measures.
The speciﬁc set of countries in our panel has been the subject of
extensive theoretical and empirical studies. Aghion and Blanchard
(1994), Kornai (1994), Blanchard (1997), Blanchard and Kremer
(1997), Hellman (1998) and Roland (2000) provide theories of
growth, U-shaped output responses, market imperfections, and the
reallocation of resources within/between public/private sectors in
transition economies. A rich empirical literature uses EBRD indices
and the similar (and earlier) De Melo et al. (1997) liberalization index
to access determinants of transition performance. De Melo et al.
(2001), Aslundet al. (1996), Fischeret al. (1996a,b), and Selowskyand
Martin (1997) analyze the impact of the cumulative De Melo et al.
(1997) index on growth, interpreting it as a measure of the speed of
reform. Havrylyshyn et al. (1998), Berg et al. (1999), Havrylyshyn and
van Rooden (2003), use ERBD and De Melo et al. (1997) indices
together with policy variables (inﬂation and ﬁscal deﬁcits) to ﬁnd that
theircombination explains mostof the variations in transition growth.
Initial studies focus on cross sections or short panels, assuming a
one-way causation from structural policies to growth. Wolf (1999)
controls for the endogeneity of policy variables and Heybey and
Murrell(1999)(inacrosssection)andFalcettietal.(2002)(inapanel)
estimate a simultaneous system to allow feedback via structural
reforms that are instrumented with one period lags. Berg et al. (1999)
andGhosh(1997) instrument stabilizationpolicies whosesigniﬁcance
was highlightedbyKornai(1994). Beckand Laeven (2006) use natural
resource endowments and time under communism as instruments for
initial conditions in cross sectional analysis. Theirs is the ﬁrst paper
that presents a conceptual framework of institutional development in
transition countries based on predetermined factors and tests this
framework using data on endowments and outcome measures of
institutional development. They also investigate the relationship
between the exogenous component of institutional development and
economic growth for transition economies and ﬁnd signiﬁcant feed-
backs and large differences compared to OLS regressions. Their
analysis motivates us to examine the growth effects of structural
policies in a panel with a theory-speciﬁed set of instruments.
Our paper features three distinct departures from the previous
literature. First, we present long time series that allows us to apply
formal econometric methods to address endogeneity. Second, we use
theory-basedinstrumentstocontrol forendogeneity in a panelsetting
building on the cross-sectional approach by Beck and Laeven (2006).
Falcetti et al. (2006) examine the effects of structural policies in
transition economies in a panel, using one period lags as instruments.
Falcetti et al. (2006) also employ a simultaneous equations approach
in which reform is inﬂuenced by civil liberties. Thus, we extend their
analysis both in methodology by focusing mostly on system-GMM
estimation and by using a fully speciﬁed and theory-based approach
to control for the endogeneity of structural policies. Also, instead of
following a Barro (1997) approach that establishes an exhaustive list
of growth determinants, we adopt the approach of Hall and Jones
(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) and focus only on the impact of
structural policies. This is not meant to detract from alternative
explanations, variables, or approaches; it is simply an attempt to
capture and highlight the aspects of institutional change. Our
robustness checks also consider alternative contemporaneous growth
determinants. Much like Acemoglu et al. (2003),w eﬁnd that
structural policies dominate.
2. Data
We examine the impact of structural policies and the rule of lawon
real GDP per capita growth between 1991 and 2001 for 26 transition
economies (Fig. 1). Since eight of these countries concluded their EU
accession negotiations in 2002, we end our analysis in 2001 to avoid
potential structural breaks. Below we simply refer to “structural
policies,” although Persson (2005) highlights that the literature's
focus on “institutions” often associates identical measures with
different labels. Hall and Jones (1999) use “social infrastructure,”
Acemoglu et al. (2005) refer to “economic institutions,” Rodrik et al.
(2004) simply say “institutions,” while Persson (2005) uses “growth
promoting policies” or “structural policies.” All of these terms are used
torefer toidentical or verysimilar fundamental data (speciﬁcally ICRG
measures of property rights protection and/or openness).
Time series for these traditional proxies of structural policies do
not exist for transition economies. Instead the components of the
EBRD liberalization index were designed to capture “the task of
building market-supporting institutions” (EBRD,1994, Chapter 1). We
utilize these EBRD (2000–2002, 2005) measures to construct a
structural policy index (see Fig. 1), consisting of price liberalization,
foreign exchange/trade liberalization, small/large scale privatization,
enterprise reform, competition policy reform, banking sector reform,
and reform of non-banking ﬁnancial institutions. Since the individual
components are highly correlated, we follow Hall and Jones (1999)
and sum all into one composite index that is normalized to a range
from zero to unity (1=OECD quality).
FischerandSahay (2004) usetheidenticalindexas“measuresofthe
extent and success of the institution building that took place in the last
decade” in transition countries. More recently, Roland (2005) uses the
exact same subindices as “institutional indicators” to graphically assess
progress in “institutional transition” in new EU member countries from
1991 to 1999. Clearly the structural policy index only proxies economic
institutions and does not represent them. The index is highlycorrelated
with the ICRG government anti-diversion index (for the overlapping
years, in 19 countries, the correlation is equal to 0.7). As an alternative
institutions index, we also use an ICRG-based Rule of Law measure. A
complete ICRG time series exist for only seven transition countries.
Partialtimeseriesexistfor18othercountries.WeextendtheICRGindex
by using countries with overlapping years to estimate a ﬁto fCampos'
(2000) Rule of Law index into the ICRG index. Campos' (2000) criteria
for establishing Rule of Law are identical to ICRG's.
In our search for alternative instruments we utilize common
proxies for political institutions, speciﬁcally “executive constraints”
4 See also Knack and Keefer (1995) and Barro (1997) among numerous studies for
OLS growth regressions that include institution indices. For a review of the role of
initial conditions in transition economies, see Murrell (1996).
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and “democracy” variables from Polity IV that reﬂect de facto
independence of the executive branch and the degree of democratic
institutions, respectively. We also use the related “checkandbalances”
and “executive indices of electoral competitiveness” from the World
Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) for robustness
checks. Finally, macro policy variables (ﬁscal deﬁcit, government
consumption, and inﬂation) are added in further robustness exercises
and are obtained from EBRD (2005).
3. Exploratory cross-country regressions
While we are ultimately interested in the time series implications
of structural policies, we commence by examining the effects of initial
conditions on long run economic performance. This exploration
acknowledges a large literature that concentrates on the signiﬁcance
of initial conditions in the transition process. Reviewing the transition
literature, Murrell (1996) suggests that political change and institu-
tional change are both related to initial conditions.
5
Fig. 2a and b shows the positive correlation between structural
policies and standards of living across countries. In 1991 there already
existed considerable variation in structural policies across countries in
our sample, indicating diverse initial conditions. The ﬁgures also
highlight thatthe change in structural policies was not constantacross
countries.By 2001 some initial laggards (Estonia, Lithuania, andLatvia
in particular) had made substantial progress towards OECD quality
structuralpolicies.Butsixofthe26countriesdidnotevenachievea0.5
rating by 2001. A possible mean reversion argument can be ruled out
from Fig. 2. Clearly, many of the early frontrunners are still the most
advancedcountries11 years later. Manycountries in the Former Soviet
Union which started at 0 in 1991 are still below average in 2001.
We augment Fig. 2a–b with two-stage least squares estimations
that address endogeneity. In the spirit of instruments that identify the
impact of “colonial history” on long term economic performance as in
Acemoglu et al. (2001),w eu t i l i z e“communist history” as an
instrument for transition countries. Our “independence” dummy
identiﬁes whether a country was independent in 1988 or not. One
hypothesis is that previously independent countries did not have to
reform structural policiesquiteas profoundlyas previously dependent
countries (including all of former Yugoslavia) that were forced to start
from scratch after independence. Here the fall of the Iron Curtain
provides our ﬁrst natural experiment. We utilize the initial variation
across countries with respect to their need to establish entirely new
structural policies in order to identify the impact on income levels, Yi
and growth, Ŷ
i. Table 1 shows that independence is indeed a strong
instrument, as indicated by the ﬁrst stage R
2. As expected, the
instrument is weaker when used to identify contemporaneous
(2001) structural policies, but it remains signiﬁcant. Note that the
positive and signiﬁcant ﬁrst stage coefﬁcient indicates that previously
independent countries started off with better initial conditions with
regard to the quality of structural policies.
Table1 alsoshowsthattheinstrumentedinitialqualityofstructural
policiesishighlysigniﬁcantinexplaining2001incomelevelsaswellas
1991–2002 income growth. Initial conditions thus seem surprisingly
important in explaining long term output levels and subsequent
growth rates, which contrasts with ﬁndings of De Melo et al. (1997,
2001) andBergetal.(1999),whoarguethatthequantitativeimpactof
initial conditions was declining over time in a shorter sample.
6
However, the convergence term in the growth regressions is not
signiﬁcant, and structural policies are signiﬁcant at the 10% level only.
This leads us to suspect that initial conditions do not capture all
determinants of ongoing growth in transition economies.
4. Theimportanceofsustainedimprovementsinstructuralpolicies
Cross-sectional analysis in the context of transition and growth
suffersdrawbacks that limit the insights thatcan be derived. Given the
short time horizon, the initial output decline, and subsequent
recovery, the regression analysis should include time trends. In
addition, the very nature of those structural policies that changed the
economy from plan to market implies that all nations experienced an
output drop and a subsequent recovery. This makes it difﬁcult for
structural policies to yield an unambiguously positive or negative
impact on growth. We thus turn to time series analysis, which derives
its power to correlate changes in structural policies with economic
growth from the variations in a) the size of the contraction, b) the
length of the contraction, c) the speed of the recovery, d) the
dramatically different growth experiences, and ﬁnally e) whether the
recovery could be sustained.
The core focus of the paper is thus to identify the impact of ongoing
and sustained structural policy improvements on economic growth. A
broad feature of Fig. 2a is how closely the speed of the recovery and
the subsequent plateauing of growth coincide with the initial speed of
structural policy change and how long it was sustained. This implies
that the transition experiencewas not one of uniform improvement in
structural policiesandgrowth,butthatthevariedcountryexperiences
are actually determined by the ongoing structural policy change. Our
5 Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995), De Melo et al. (1997, 2001), Fischer et al. (1996a,b),
Denizer (1997), and Beck and Laeven (2006) include initial conditions in their
analyses.
6 Note that these studies refer to the initial conditions as characteristics of the
country prior to the beginning of transition. The panel results in Section 4 will make
this distinction clearer than the cross-sectional approach can.
Fig. 2. Effects of initial conditions and structural policies on economic performance.
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hope is that these dynamics assist us in identifying the effect of
structural policies on growth in our panel.
The unique advantage of our panel dataset is that we can trace the
annual impact of structural change on growth over the eleven-year
period. Note that the approach is very different from event studies
that examine the effects of structural policies in “transition time,”
which identiﬁes howlongit takestohave sufﬁcientlystrongstructural
policies in place to generate growth after the fall of communism in a
country. Instead we utilize the variation from different transition
experiences to understand how structural policies affect growth over
time. In that sense it is even helpful for us that reforms started in two
waves, with Former Soviet Union countries entering transition later.
This provides additional variation while controlling for time ﬁxed
effects. However we compare our results to transition time results
below for completeness.
4.1. Time series methodology
To control for variables that do not change over time such as
history, geography, and independence, we estimate the ﬁxed effects
OLS (LSDV) and system-GMM regressions for:
ˆ Yi;t = α + βIi;t + γlnYi;t−1 + ηi + mt + ei;t ð1Þ
where Ŷ
i,t is per capital income growth in country i at time t, I is the
structural policy index described above, α is a constant, ηi captures
country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects, and νt time ﬁxed effects. The inclusion
of time ﬁxed effects ensures thatour results are not contaminated bya
possible common trend in the variables of interest. Nickell (1981)
shows that the LSDV estimator in Eq. (1) is biased in a dynamic panel;
simulation studies demonstrate that the lagged dependent variable
LSDV coefﬁcient is biased downwards, whereas other coefﬁcients are
less affected (see Judson and Owen, 1999; Gaduh, 2002; Hauk and
Wacziarg, 2004). Kiviet (1995) derived a correction for this LSDV bias,
which we implement using Bruno's (2005a,b) procedure.
To explore the time-series properties of the data, we conduct a
Levin et al. (2002) panel unit root test, which rejects the null
hypothesis of a common unit root for both the growth rate and for the
structural reform index. In addition, an Im et al. (2003) test rejects the
null hypothesis of individual unit roots for growth rates and the
structural reform index. Following Bond et al. (2001), whenever
lagged GDP is included as an explanatory variable, we express the
lagged GDP in deviations from time means. This eliminates a common
time trend in lnYi,t over the eleven-year horizon and renders this
variable stationary. Thus all variables entering Eq. (1) are stationary
when controlling for time ﬁxed effects.
Highly persistent time series may introduce weak instrument bias,
in which case the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-GMM
estimator may not be appropriate in the growth context.
7 The
Blundell and Bond (1998) system-GMM estimator alleviates the issue:
ˆ Yi;t − ˆ Yi;t−1 = βΔIi;t + γΔlnYi;t−1 + Δmt + Δei;t ð2Þ
As in Arellano and Bond (1991) this estimator uses a difference
equation to eliminate constant country-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and Δ
represents a variable's time difference. To identify the coefﬁcients in
Eq. (2), Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest that lags two and higher of
Ii,t and lnYi,t−1 are used as instruments. When measurementerror and
endogeneity pose additional problems, Bond (2002) suggests longer
lags (we thus use lags three to ﬁve). To avoid overﬁtting bias, once the
number of instruments increases relative to the number of observa-
tions, we restrict the instruments tooneforeach variable andtime lag.
In the presence of highly persistent series, the difference-GMM
estimator may be subject to weak instrument bias. Blundell and Bond
(1998) show that Eq. (1) provides additional moment conditions,
given the explanatory variables' mean stationarity that can be utilized
to estimate the coefﬁcients consistently. These moment conditions
use lagged differences of the explanatory variables in Eq. (1) as
instruments. Since endogeneity and measurement error may pose a
potential problem, we use lag two (instead of lag one) as instruments
for the moment conditions derived from Eq. (1).
Since we control for lagged income, the current growth rate should
beinﬂuencedonlythroughcurrentstructuralpolicies.Thethreetoﬁve
year lags then inﬂuence growth only through their effects on current
institutions. This is the crucial assumption for the validity of using the
system-GMM approach to eliminate endogeneity bias in our case. We
will also use a theory-based, alternative IV strategy in Section 5 below.
The lag structure then also hypothesizes that lagged structural policies
mayaffectcurrentgrowthotherthanthroughcurrent institutions. The
presenceofmultiplelagsallows a testof thisexclusionrestrictionwith
the help of an over-identiﬁcation test. We report the results from a
Sargan(HansenJ)overidentiﬁcationtest,aswellastheArellano–Bond
test for AR(2) serial correlation in the residuals. Both tests allow an
assessment of whether the chosen identiﬁcation strategy of the
system-GMM estimator is valid.
In our discussion we concentrate on the system-GMM coefﬁcients
as the most reliable estimates since this method best addresses
potential endogeneity bias as outlined in Bond (2002) and Bond et al.
(2001). Nevertheless, the Nickell-bias corrected LSDV estimates serve
as useful benchmarks and provide country ﬁxed effects. The usual
caveat applies that all instrumental variables estimations rely on an
“essentially non-testable hypothesis” (Acemoglu, 2005). In our
approach, we must assume that three- to ﬁve-year lagged values are
unaffected by current growth and have no direct effect beyond their
impact on contemporaneous institutions. Instead of relying only on
lag structures, we will also provide an additional theory-based
alternative below.
4.2. Time series evidence
In Table 2 we ﬁrst report the coefﬁcient produced by what, in our
view,isthemostappropriateeconometricmethodology(systemGMM).
Acrossallspeciﬁcations,themagnitudeofthestructuralpolicyestimates
is surprisingly large. In our baseline speciﬁcation (column 2), a 10%
increaseinthestructuralpolicyindexisassociatedwitha2.68%increase
in growth. These are sizable growth possibilities that can be reaped from
structural policy changes. Note, however, that this sizable impact does
not imply a constant change in the growth rate. The lagged income
variable allows us to calculate level effects that we discuss below.
7 See Hauk and Wacziarg (2004), Bond et al. (2001), and Levine et al. (2000).
Table 1





























2 0.34 0.19 0.45
N2 5 2 5 2 6 2 6 2 2 2 2
Superscripts ⁎/⁎⁎/⁎⁎⁎ denote 10, 5, and 1% signiﬁcance levels. White-standard errors in
parentheses. A constant (not reported) was included in all regressions. Estimation:
2SLS; instrument: country-independence prior to 1989.
173 T.S. Eicher, T. Schreiber / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 169–179Author's personal copy
Large impacts of institutions on economic performance are not new
to the literature. Prominent studies by Hall and Jones (1999, p.105) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001, p. 1387) ﬁnd that ten percent increases in
institutional quality raiselongrunoutputlevelsbyroughly67%and160%,
respectively. Using the above estimates on the structural policy index
and the estimate on lagged output per capita also allows us to calculate
animpliedleveleffectandcompareittotheestimatesfromthelongrun
institutions literature. We ﬁnd that a ten percent improvement in the
qualityof structuralpolicies implies anincreaseof GDP percapita in the
long run by about 55%. Here we deﬁne the long run as half a century.
These level effects are therefore in line with Hall and Jones (1999) and
bit lower than the very long run ﬁndings in Acemoglu et al. (2001)
where the long run is probably better understood as a 200–400 year
period.
We must keep in mind that the usefulness of the natural
experiment is almost by deﬁnition conﬁned to the short and medium
run. When countries ﬁnish their transition and enter the EU, for
example, a structural break occurs. What we ﬁnd is an example of a
signiﬁcant growth acceleration along the lines of Hausmann et al.
(2005). It is tempting to associate the impact of structural policies
with great strides in early phases of the transition. However, column 5
conﬁrms that if we start the analysis in 1994, the magnitude of the
coefﬁcient is just about identical — and its standard error is even
slightly smaller. The robustness test that excludes early reform years
thus provides evidence that ongoing reforms are more crucial for
growth than initial periods of opportunity.
While the coefﬁcients in Table 2 may appear large at ﬁrst, the
magnitude is remarkably robust across different speciﬁcations that
include interaction terms (columns 3–4,10,12,14,16), a shorter panel
(column 4), the inclusion of macro policy variables that determine
growth (column 5), annual growth rates (columns 2–5, 9–10, 13–16),
event studies based on “transition time”
8 (columns 9–10), or three-
year averaged growth
9 (columns 11–12). In all speciﬁcations the
Arellano and Bond AR(2) and the Sargan (Hansen J) tests support our
assumption of instrument exogeneity and report no evidence of serial
correlation. The exceptions are the three-year averaged results where
we judge the dynamic panel to be too short to gain conﬁdence in the
instruments. The other exception is the introduction of macro policy
variables where the instrumentation with lagged dependent values
does not seem to provide good instruments. Acemoglu et al. (2003)
point out that this biases results in favor of macro policies.
Our results extend the existing literature by using both panel data
and allowing for endogeneity of institutions. Falcetti et al. (2006) also
employ system-GMM estimation and ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive
effect of structural policies on growth. They instrument with a one
period lag and do not explore theory based instruments in a dynamic
panel setting. Beck and Laeven (2006) use cross-sectional analysis to
estimate the causal effect of institutions and structural policies on
growth. They motivate natural resource endowments and socialist
entrenchment as instruments for institution building. These instru-
ments are, however, not available to us in panel analysis, since they
lack a time dimension.
We can, however, build on the Beck and Laeven (2006) results by
establishing a stronger case for causality of structural policies in a
panel setting while using a variety of techniques to control for
endogeneity. In addition to the analysis in this sectionwe also employ
a hierarchy of institutions approach below which uses political
institutions as instruments for structural policies. Havrylyshyn and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8 At times, the transition literature accounts for different starting dates with event
studies. We follow Merlevede's (2003) deﬁnition for each country's t=1 in which
communism and central planning were abandoned.
9 Averaging is a common robustness test; see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2003) or
Burnside and Dollar (2000).
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policies in transition. We follow this direction in a formal two-stage
empirical model in this section and in Section 5 below.
Many studies apply a similar form of analysis to individual
countries that are included in our sample, or to speciﬁc reforms that
are captured in our structural policy index. Chaptea (2007) analyzes
the impact of trade liberalization and trade relations with EU
countries. Bennett et al. (2007) and focus on the effects on growth
of different forms of privatization, ﬁnding a strong positive correlation
between voucher privatization and growth. Wacziarg and Welch
(2008) include transition economies in their analysis of trade
liberalization and growth and ﬁnd that average annual growth rates
increase by about 1.5%. De Macedo and Martins (2008) ﬁnd evidence
for a channel from structural reforms to growth and also concentrate
on the interactions of the different components of the index. Guariglia
and Poncet (2008) show the positive effect of market driven reforms
in ﬁnancial markets for growth in China, Havrylyshyn (2008) focuses
on the differences between countries in the CIS and Eastern Europe.
Popov (2007) divides the transition experience into two parts: an
early adverse supply shock and a later recovery. He also ﬁnds a
positive correlation between liberalization, which is building on
strong institutions, and growth.
The value-added of our paper lies in its structured approach to
estimation in a dynamic panel setting with a broad range of structural
policies. We use a broad index of structural policies for all available
transition economies and our results show a strongly positive causal
effect that is present when employing a variety of different
econometric speciﬁcations. In addition we can conﬁrm evidence for
the relative importance of initial conditions over the long panel.
In the cross section, Table 1, initial conditions matter. The dynamic
estimations in Table 2 attribute great explanatory power to ongoing
structural change.It is impossibletoseparate out the individualeffects
in the latter since initial conditions are indistinguishable from country
ﬁxed effects in the dynamic panel. We judge this to be an advantage of
the panel estimation, since it helps us avoid the lively discussion
regarding the correct initial conditions that are to be examined (see
De Melo et al., 2001; Campos and Coricelli, 2002, for excellent
surveys). In an effort to relate initial conditions to ongoing structural
policy reform and growth, we include a term which interacts the
initial 1991 structural policy level with subsequent values. Campos
and Coricelli (2002) suggest that such an interaction term highlights
the relationship between initial conditions and subsequent structural
policy development. There seems to be broad agreement in the
literature that the level of initial conditions may affect the intensity of
the structural policy changes.
10 The interaction term is never
signiﬁcant in any GMM speciﬁcations, whereas the structural policy
index's magnitude and signiﬁcance remain unchanged throughout.
This has three important implications. First, excellent growth can be
attained even with unfavorable initial conditions. Second, there exists
no “growth bonus” for countries that reformed early. Third, a “growth
penalty” does not exist even if reforms start late, as long as they
eventually reach sufﬁcient quality. These ﬁndings support the
robustness results in Table 2, column 4, that ongoing structural policy
change matters even when initial years of transition are excluded.
While our general approach follows Hall and Jones (1999) and
Acemoglu et al. (2001) in focusing on the impact of institutions only,
alternative variables have been suggested in the literature to also
determine economic performance in transition economies. Consensus
variables include the ﬁscal deﬁcit, government consumption, and
inﬂation.
11 As an additional robustness check we add these variables
to the regressions. Structural policy and the ﬁscal deﬁcit are signi-
ﬁcant; however, government consumption is not. Structural policies
are highly correlated with inﬂation (column 8), which rules out a
strategy to include both in one regression.
As a further robustness exercise, we offer the Kiviet (1995) bias-
corrected LSDV results (columns 13–14) and as well those based on
the original Arellano and Bond (1991) difference-GMM estimator that
allows for shorter lags (one to three) as instruments (columns 15–16).
In terms of signiﬁcance, the results are just about identical to the
System-GMM results; however, the estimates are slightly higher,
reﬂecting the biases discussed in Section 4a.
As in previous empirical analyses of transition economies, country
ﬁxed effects are prominent in the dynamic panel. Fixed effects range
from 0.18 (Slovenia) to −0.2 (Tajikistan). The difference between the
highest and lowest country's ﬁxed effect is almost 0.4, and therefore
considerably larger than the LSDV coefﬁcient on structural policies.
Hencenotonlystructural change,butalsotheinﬂuenceofﬁxedeffects
on growth is considerable. We can only conjecture about the sources
of the ﬁxed effects. The correlation between ﬁxed effects and the
Fidrmuc (2001) “Distance to Brussels” measure is surprisingly large
(−0.73), indicating that close proximity to the EU generated a
signiﬁcant growth bonus.
12 Such a bonus could be explained by a
multitude of causes ranging from the EU-accession-induced institu-
tional changes to simple gravity or multinational entry/production
diversiﬁcation decisions.
The correlation between ﬁxed effects and the quality of initial
structural policies is of the same magnitude (0.62), indicating that
initially better structural policies potentially exert a level effect on
subsequent growth. These two variables exhaust by no means all
possible interpretations of the ﬁxed effects estimates. The goal of our
dynamic panel analysis is solely to showthateven short-term changes
in structural policies can substantially impact growth after ﬁxed
factors have been taken into account. Among these factors are
naturally all variables related to geography and history such as, for
example, natural resource endowment and socialist entrenchment
which were used, for example, by Beck and Laeven (2006) or Falcetti
et al. (2006). It is also common in the transition literature to include
other, time varying factors such as the size of the government debt,
inﬂation etc. Here we follow the strict Hall and Jones (1999) approach
that focuses squarely in the structural policies of interest to avoid that
other regressors, that may share a covariance structure with structural
policies, may conﬂate the effects of structural policies.
Akeyadditionalexercise is toexaminewhetherthesestrongshort-
term growth results hold up to alternative measures of structural
policies/institutions. Table 3 reports the results for our ICRG-based
Rule of Law measure which is perhaps closer and more narrowly
focused on institutional change. Though we normally think of the Rule
ofLawasrelativelyconstantovertime,thetransitioncountriesprovide
a unique laboratory where this assumption is less likely to hold. For
example Albania saw its Rule of Law measure increase from 0.33 in
1992 to 0.833 in 1994/95 and then fall back to 0.5 in 1997/98. There is
every reason to believe that ﬁrms should respond quickly to
improvements in this area, or at least no more slowly than to changes
instructuralpoliciesanalyzedabove.Suchresponseshavenotyetbeen
convincingly examined. Since the structural change and Rule of Law
measures are normalized in identical fashion, their coefﬁcients can be
readily compared. The results are just about identical in terms of
signiﬁcance and magnitude. A ten % increase in the Rule of Law index
toward OECD levels increases growth by 2.4 % (column 2). Again the
estimates are remarkably robust in terms of economic and statistical
signiﬁcance across all different speciﬁcations that include shorter
panels (column 4), the inclusion of macro policy variables that
10 See, e.g., Di Tommaso et al. (2007), De Melo et al. (2001, 1997), Balcerowicz and
Gelb (1995), and Aslund et al. (1996).
11 It is common to treat macro policy variables as exogenous in the literature. The
GMM methodology also instruments for macro variables using lags.
12 Interestingly the −0.44 correlation with “Distance to Moscow” is neither positive,
nor as large as one might expect.
175 T.S. Eicher, T. Schreiber / Journal of Development Economics 91 (2010) 169–179Author's personal copy
determine growth (column 5–6), annual growth rates (columns 2–6,
9–10,13–16),eventstudiesbasedon“transitiontime”(columns9–10),
or three-year averaged growth (columns 11–12). Even the same bias
pattern can be observed in the LSDV and difference GMM regressions
(columns 13–16) as in Table 2. We also include a speciﬁcation that
includes macro policy variables, Rule of Law, and structural policies
(column 6) to show the independent effects of either institutional
variable even in the presence of macro policy determinants. One
important difference exists betweenTables 2 and 3. For all regressions
with interactions between initial levels and subsequent changes in the
RuleofLaw,bothestimatesarenotsigniﬁcant.Thisismostlikelydueto
a high degree of multicollinearity. Initial Rule of Law varied from 0.1 to
0.9 in 1991 while it varied only from 0.1 to 0.4 for structural policies.
Hence in the Rule of Law regressions we cannot disentangle the
separate effects of initial conditions and ongoing change. However,
the regressions do show that even after controlling for initial Rule
of Law with ﬁxed effects, ongoing changes in Rule of Law are highly
signiﬁcant.
5. Alternativeinstruments:thehierarchyofinstitutionshypothesis
The previous section has shown that structural policies and
institutions have a large causal effect on growth when lagged values
of institutions are used as instruments. This section explores an
alternative identiﬁcation strategy that relies not on lagged values, but
on a clear structurally formulated hypothesis and a formal two stage
estimation process to identify the effect of structural policies on
growth. Acemoglu et al. (2005) clearly outlined those political
institutions that allocate excessive power to an individual (or a
small group) to render it unlikely that structural policies are sustained
to protect property rights for all. The authors describe a chain of
events where political institutions determine the distribution of de
jure political power, which in turn affects the choice of structural
policies (“economic institutions” in their terminology). This frame-
work is introduced as a hierarchy of institutions, where political
institutions inﬂuence equilibrium structural policies, which then
determine economic outcomes.
13
Acemoglu et al. (2005) summarize examples of political institu-
tions as “democracy vs. dictatorship or autocracy, and the extent of
constraints on politicians and political elites.” Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005) motivate the Polity IV variable “executive constraints” as
“conceptually attractive since it measures institutional and other
constraints that are placed on presidents and dictators. Theoretically,
we expect a society where elites and politicians are effectively
constrained to experience less inﬁghting between various groups to
take control of thestate,and topursue more sustainable policies.” This
certainly applies directly to transition countries were successful
structural policies can be seen as the outcome of effective political
participation. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) also address speciﬁcally
how executive constraints are uniquely applicable to transition
economies and our natural experiment. In societies with weak
constraints on rulers, “[f]ollowing a change in the balance of political
power, groups that gain politically may then attempt to use their new
power to redistribute assets and income to themselves, in the process
creating economic turbulence. In contrast, this source of turbulence
would be largely absent in societies where institutions prevent this
type of redistribution.” And “politicians may be forced to pursue
unsustainable policies in order to satisfy various groups and remain in
power, and volatility may result when these policies are abandoned.”
Acemoglu et al. (2005) note also, however, the common caveat that
13 A large literature has analyzed the importance of political institutions for economic
development. See, e.g., Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Acemoglu
et al. (2005), Persson (2004), Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), Keefer (2007), Kaufmann
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empirics cannot distinguish between the exact channels that link
political institutions to structural policies.
Alternative measures are proposed by Keefer (2007) who argues
that the “check and balances” index and the “executive indices of
electoral competitiveness” from the World Bank Database of Political
Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) are better variables to gauge the effects
of political institutions on growth. Keefer (2007) argues that checks
and balances capture the essential ingredients necessary for secure
property rights: elections and checks on the executive branch.
However, unlike the Polity IV executive constraints measure, Keefer
(2007) argues, checks and balances captures only the formal
constraints that theory predicts should protect property rights, not
whether those formal constraints are binding in practice. Electoral
Competitiveness is employed by Keefer (2007) to reﬂect that political
systems in which government turnover is competitive make it harder
for special interests to “capture” the government and/or the state as a
whole (see also Hoff et al., 2005). Persson et al. (2000) reﬁne the
concept further by specifying whether the executive is subject to a
conﬁdence requirement in the legislature to distinguish between the
type of democracy and the resulting structural policies. Their type of
democracy variable is not available for transition economies; we
proxy it with the Polity IV democracy variable.
Political institutions are not entirely exogenous either, however.
They change slowly and Acemoglu et al. (2005) point out that
societies change their constitutions during transitions from dictator-
ship to democracy to modify executive constraints. It is hard to argue,
however, that lagged political institutions affects subsequent year-to-
year output growth. For one, the hierarchy of institution hypothesis
clearlyoutlinesthatpolitical changesﬁrst affectstructural policiesand
then output. No exact test can reveal how long the time lag is,
however; the ultimate test is that neither variable possesses a direct
effect on output as seen in columns 8–10 in Table 4. Clearly, the crucial
assumption here is that these political institutions affect growth only
through structural policies. In the case of our sample one additional
explanation for the lack of a direct effect may be that through
economic reform via structural policies democratic institutions gain
additional traction. Thus any growth effect has to come through
changes in structural policies in these unique circumstances of
transition from plan to market. This argument is similar to the recent
discussion of the need to build democratic capital in order to develop
using a much longer time horizon (Persson and Tabellini 2007). We
also perform a Sargan test, which supports our assumption of
exogeneity. Theoretical and empirical support for our choice of
instruments is also provided by a prominent strand of the transition
literature which hypothesizes about extensive links between political
transition and the intensity of economic institution reform (although
not necessarily output changes).
14
The hierarchy of institutions approach is implemented in Table 4
using both LSDV and GMM. The LSDV regressions show the strength of
the instrument in a mimic ﬁrst stage, and the system-GMM then
delivers unbiased second stage coefﬁcients. To investigate the
strength of the instruments, we regress structural policies on the
various political institutions that were motivated above, together with
time ﬁxed effects (columns 2, 4, and 6). The goodness of ﬁt in the ﬁrst
stages is substantial; the political institutions are all signiﬁcant with
the exception of Checks and Balances in the Keefer (2007) motivated
speciﬁcation (column 3). Together with ﬁxed effects and lagged
income, political institutions account for between 74 to 83% of the
variation in economic institutions. The F-tests reject the null-
hypothesis of no explanatory power of all regressors at the one
percent level. These results show the interdependence of political
institutions and structural policies and are thus important conﬁrma-
tions of the hierarchy of institutions hypothesis. Note that these
political institutions do not seem to inﬂuence growth signiﬁcantly
when introduced directly in system-GMM regressions as in Section 4
(columns 7, 8, and 9). This is further support for the hierarchy of
institutions approach. Also the Sargan over-id tests do not suggest
misspeciﬁcation for any of the regressions. Yet, as with any
instrument, we cannot ultimately test its validity but believe the
case for this new approach to be strong, both theoretically and
empirically. To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst paper to provide a
theory-based approach to control for endogeneity in this context in a
panel setting. It thus builds on Beck and Laeven (2006), who provide a
theory-based IV strategy in a cross-sectional set-up.
Having established sufﬁciently strong instruments, we present the
instrumented system-GMM structural policy estimates of Eq. (1) in
Table 4. Here we use the instrument in the level equations only. The
coefﬁcients on structural policies using the hierarchy of institutions as
identiﬁcation are exactly in line with the ones observed in Tables 2
and 3. While structural policies are slightly less signiﬁcant (as
compared to the System-GMM coefﬁcients using lags in Tables 2
and 3), we take this as important, independent support of the
signiﬁcant effects of ongoing structural change on growth. Both the
Sargan overidentiﬁcation test and the AR(2) test of the residuals
provide support for this identiﬁcation strategy.
Table 4
































































0.474 0.670 0.574 0.624 0.994 0.685
AR(2) test p-value 0.913 0.808 0.908 0.239 0.421 0.896
R
2 0.83 0.74 0.82
N 241 241 200 200 245 245 241 200 245
Notes: Superscripts ⁎/⁎⁎/⁎⁎⁎ denote 10, 5, and 1% signiﬁcance levels. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include country- and time ﬁxed effects.
14 See e.g., Balcerowicz and Gelb (1995), De Melo et al. (1997), Aslund et al. (1996).
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6. Conclusion
Transition economies offer a unique natural experiment to assess
the impact of structural policy changes on economic growth. Two
alternative approaches that control for the endogeneity of structural
policy and time ﬁxed effects ﬁnd similar strong economically and
statistically signiﬁcant impact. A ten percent improvement of
structural policies toward OECD standards increases subsequent
growth by about 2.7%. The magnitude of the result is robust to
variations in the length of the panel, to event studies in transition
time, to averaged growth rates as dependent variables, and to the
inclusion of alternative public policy variables. Examining the
interaction between initial and subsequent structural policies allows
us to show that early (late) movers do not incur a growth bonus
(penalty). To test whether the results hold for other measures of
institutions as well, we construct the ﬁrst complete time series for an
ICRG based Rule of Law indicator in transition countries (using
Campos, 2000, and ICRG data). Here results are just about identical in
terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance.
Our results show more than the importance of institutions for a
speciﬁc set of countries. We replicate the results that institutions
matter in the long run, but more importantly we are able to document
the contemporaneous effect of institutional change on economic
growth. This should be comforting for policy makers. Economic
institutional reform and well designed structural policies can lead to
rapid growth beneﬁts; it does not have to take decades for the effects
to show. Our use of multiple estimation techniques, all of which
generate comparable results in terms of economic and statistical
signiﬁcance, highlights the power of this natural experiment to track
institutional change across a sizeable number of countries.
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